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The trend of implementing the IPv6 into wireless sensor networks (WSNs) has recently occurred as a consequence of a tendency of
their integration with other types of IP-based networks.The paper deals with the security aspects of these IPv6-basedWSNs. A brief
analysis of security threats and attacks which are present in the IPv6-based WSN is given. The solution to an adaptive distributed
system for malicious node detection in the IPv6-based WSN is proposed. The proposed intrusion detection system is based on
distributed algorithms and a collective decision-making process. It introduces an innovative concept of probability estimation for
malicious behaviour of sensor nodes. The proposed system is implemented and tested through several different scenarios in three
different network topologies. Finally, the performed analysis showed that the proposed system is energy efficient and has a good
capability to detect malicious nodes.
1. Introduction
Numerous intelligent sensors with basic computational and
wireless communication capabilities are currently embedded
into various devices and instruments worldwide. Since their
number is growing rapidly, it could be expected that wireless
sensor nodes will vastly outnumber conventional computers
and other networked devices in the near future. Wire-
less sensor networks (WSNs) were the subject of intensive
research and development during the last decade [1–3]. Due
to strict resource constraints (both power and computational)
the implementation of conventional Internet protocol archi-
tecture in WSNs used to be avoided at first, resulting in
numerous noninteroperable solutions. Further development
of WSNs naturally led to efforts to interconnect and integrate
a WSN with conventional IP networks. These efforts resulted
in certain frameworks and adaptation standards that enable
the use of the IP in a WSN environment.
At the same time, a conventional IP network has also
evolved and currently passes through the gradual implemen-
tation of the IPv6 (Internet Protocol version 6) that should
replace the IPv4 in the future [4]. Current technologies of the
WSN and IPv6 are highly complementary, and many efforts
are currently focused on convergence of IPv6 and low power
multihop WSNs. The integration of sensor networks with IP
networks will significantly diverse their array of applications.
Certainly, it is possible to realize such integration efficiently
and transparently for the end user, but there still remain
some problems that require novel adequate solutions or
optimization of existing solutions. Seamless integration of
sensor networks with IP networks that satisfies demands
on flexibility, scalability, and robustness represents the most
important foundation for the Internet of Things (IoT) con-
cept [5]. Thereby, the accent is on the implementation of
the IPv6, since it provides huge address space and autocon-
figuration mechanisms and extensibility (to support future
innovations).
Very important aspects of the Internet of Things are
security issues and their adequate solutions [6]. Solutions
to security issues are an important precondition for wider
acceptance and use of integrated sensor networks with IP
networks. The implementation of the IPv6 into WSNs brings
some specificities that hamper the use of existing security
solutions known from IPv6 networks and conventional sen-
sor networks. It is necessary to thoroughly adapt existing
solutions and to invent novel solutions for the implemen-
tation in IPv6-based sensor networks. Node compromise
and malicious behaviour make a quite possible scenario,
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especially in networks with a large number of nodes, such as
sensor networks.
The lack of quality, effective, and energy efficient intrusion
detection system for IPv6-based WSN was the strongest
motivation for the authors to focus the research efforts into
this area. Existing proposals of intrusion detection systems
forWSNs are focused on conventionalWSNs, without taking
care of certain specificities of IPv6-basedWSNs.The fact that
IPv6-based WSNs (being the basis of the Internet of Things)
may possibly include a very large number of nodes motivated
the authors to focus their research on distributed system
based on cooperative algorithms and collective decision-
making. Diversity of possible applications of IPv6-based
WSNs was a motive to develop adaptive system suitable for
different application requirements.
Therefore, this paper proposes a system for detecting
malicious nodes in an IPv6-basedWSN.Theproposed system
is designed for the IPv6 environment and it supports the IPv6
stack in a WSN. It is implemented into the sensor network
that uses the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and the 6LoWPAN
adaptation layer. For routing purposes, the RPL (routing
protocol for low power and lossy networks) was implemented
as the first routing protocol for sensor networks with full
support for the IPv6. The UDP (user datagram protocol) is
used as the transport layer protocol.The system formalicious
node detection is implemented at the application layer. The
proposed system uses cooperative algorithms and a collective
decision-making procedure, so it is fully distributed and
adaptive. Besides node characterization as malicious or legit-
imate, the system also estimates a probability of malicious
behaviour for suspected nodes.The paper presents the imple-
mentation of the IPv6 stack into the WSN. Furthermore, the
descriptions of the proposed intrusion detection system and
its implementation are also given.The system is implemented
in different characteristic scenarios, and the obtained results
are analysed. Finally, some conclusions are drawn and some
suggestions for future development are outlined.
2. IPv6 in Wireless Sensor Networks
The development of the IPv6 started in 1995, when it was
obvious that some problems with the IPv4 will become more
emphasised in the future (e.g., address space exhaustion,
security issues, complex configuration, and routing table
enlargement). Compared with IPv4, the IPv6 brings some
significant improvements, such as 128-bit address space,
a fixed-length simplified header, autoconfiguration mecha-
nisms, and security improvements. Currently, the transition
from IPv4 to the IPv6 is a long-lasting ongoing process [7].
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) represent a special
subgroup of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). However,
strong computational and power limitations make them
in some aspects significantly different from conventional
MANETs. A WSN consists of a large number of inexpensive
sensor nodes capable of sensing, basic data processing, and
wireless communication with other nodes. WSN functions
are based on communication between nodes and collabora-
tive algorithms. Unfortunately, due to the above-mentioned
limitations, most of existing technical and algorithmic solu-
tions known fromMANETs cannot be directly applied to the
WSN. Therefore, the WSN required adaptations of existing
solutions and development of novel ones. Strict demands
for low costs, small node dimensions, and energy efficiency
noticeably influence the design of networking protocols and
algorithms. They are designed with focus on consumption
minimisation to prolong network lifetime. Since sensor nodes
may be equipped with many different types of sensors,
wireless sensor networks have a large variety of possible
applications [8]. Sensor nodes with adequate sensors can
be used for both continuous monitoring of the observed
phenomenon and detection of certain events. In addition
to detection, they can also identify the event that occurred
and designate its location. Also, sensor nodes can be locally
connected with different types of actuators. Today, WSNs are
used for various military, environmental, health, home, and
industrial applications.
In the beginning of WSN development, the implementa-
tion of the omnipresent and generally accepted IP stack into
the WSN was considered impractical and inadequate. The
IP was considered too demanding to operate properly with
strongly limited resources. Therefore, the WSN usually used
some alternative solutions (different protocols developed
specially for WSNs) and avoided the IP. Unfortunately, a
variety of protocols and the absence of a unique standard
limited connectivity and interoperability of sensor networks
with other types of networks. Consequently, during the last
few years many efforts were focused on the implementation
of the IP into the WSN, with necessary adaptations [9–11].
Since traditional IP networks are in transition from IPv4 to
the IPv6, focus is on the implementation of the IPv6 into
WSN.
The IETF working group 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low
power Wireless Personal Area Network) defined the nec-
essary adaptation layer that enables the implementation of
the IPv6 into the WSN protocol stack. The adaptation is
indispensable since the frame size used on the WSN physical
layer is usually much smaller than that in conventional IP
networks. The dominant standard for the physical layer in
WSNs is currently IEEE 802.15.4. Therefore, the 6LoWPAN
adaptation layer enables adaptation of an IPv6 packet for
transmission within the IEEE 802.15.4 frame.The 6LoWPAN
adaptation layer defines frame format, forming methods for
link-local addresses and address autoconfiguration methods
in networks based on IEEE 802.15.4. Additional specifica-
tions include methods for IPv6 header compression because
of easier transfer over IEEE 802.15.4 links and resource
savings. Although the IEEE 802.15.4 standard defines four
types of frames (beacon frames, MAC command frames,
acknowledgement frames, and data frames), IPv6 packets
can be transferred only within data frames. Optionally,
acknowledgements for received packets can be used.
A full IPv6 packet is too large for the IEEE 802.15.4
frame which has 127 bytes on the physical layer. Without
any compressionmethods (maximal overhead) andwith AES
(advanced encryption standard) used on the data link layer,
it would leave only 33 bytes available for the application layer
data. Clearly, fragmentation would be necessary for larger
data transfer. Since the fragmentation process consumes
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additional resources, the 6LoWPAN adaptation layer focuses
on header compression possibilities to get packets that could
inmost cases fit into the IEEE 802.15.4 frame. 6LoWPAN also
defines compression of the UDP header and in the best case
(local unicast communication) the UDP and IPv6 header can
be compressed into 6 bytes.
The IETF working group ROLL (Routing Over Low
power and Lossy networks) specified a new RPL (where wire-
less sensor networks also belong).The RPL is the first routing
protocol with IPv6 support suitable for sensor networks. It
was designed as a modular protocol, with a mandatory core
part and optional application-depending features. It was used
as a routing protocol for an IPv6-based WSN in all analysed
scenarios [12].
3. Security Aspects of Wireless
Sensor Networks
Security issues in wireless networks are more challenging
than in wired networks due to the open nature of the
communication medium. Therefore, it is often more diffi-
cult to secure MANETs compared to conventional wired
networks. Although WSNs are a special subset of MANETs,
their strong resource limitations bring additional difficulties
in their security aspects. Since most of wireless networks
also use the TCP/IP stack, most of security threats known
from wired networks persist in wireless networks [13, 14].
Further, a wireless environment brings some new security
threats unknown in wired networks. There are some differ-
ences between the WSN and MANET that disable a direct
implementation of known MANET security mechanisms
into the WSN: the WSN may have a significantly larger
number of nodes that are more densely deployed, sensor
nodes are prone to failures (due to environmental effects and
limited power supply) and have stronger resource limitations
than a typical MANET node, and WSNs usually use a
broadcast communication paradigm, while point-to-point
communication still dominates in MANETs [15–19].
Specified differences make WSNs more vulnerable to
denial-of-service attacks. Also, well-known public key cryp-
tography methods are still practically inapplicable in WSNs
because of their computational demands. Development of
quality key management mechanisms, secure routing pro-
tocols, secure data aggregation mechanisms, and intrusion
detection mechanisms still represents a great challenge in
WSNs, especially in an IPv6-based WSN.
Providing physical security of every sensor node in the
WSN would require significant costs, which would also be
contrary to the WSN concept as a network of cheap network
nodes. Therefore, in most cases WSNs are considered to be
prone to physical attacks, and research is focused on different
methods for detection and prevention of different possible
attack types where the attacker does not have any physical
contact with sensor nodes or the base station.
A large variety of possible attack types can be classified
according to different criterions. The attacks on the WSN
can be divided into outsider attacks (originated from nodes
that do not belong to the targeted network) and insider
attacks (former legitimate nodes are compromised and start
with malicious behaviour) [20]. Also, attacks can be passive
(eavesdropping and tracking of transferred data) or active
(include certain modifications of existing dataflows and
creating of newdata intentionally by the attacker).The attacks
on the sensor network can be focused on confidentiality
and authentication, network availability (denial-of-service
attacks), or data and service integrity.
The attacks focused on the physical layer are jamming and
tampering. The attacker can use their transmitter to cause
interference intentionally on WSN operational frequencies.
Advanced methods for interference avoidance (like FHSS
communication) increase sensor node complexity and raise
their cost and energy consumption. Since in most WSNs
communication is limited to only one channel, they are
usually very vulnerable to jamming attacks. Also, in most
cases sensor nodes are not physically protected, so they are
exposed to tampering.Therefore, all security mechanisms for
WSNs have to predict possible compromise of certain nodes
and to implement a mechanism for their exclusion from the
network [21].
If two or more nodes try to transmit at the same
frequency, the collision will occur, causing packet loss. The
attacker may intentionally cause collisions, most frequently
during transmissions of acknowledgements. It is not difficult
to detect such attack type, but it is very difficult to protect
against them. If collision occurs, nodes continuously try
to retransmit the packets, which may result in resource
exhaustion [22, 23]. Resource exhaustion by retransmission
can be reduced by limiting the frequency of medium access
(on the MAC layer) and by using time-division multiplexing.
Some attacks on sensor networks focus on a routing
mechanism, where the attacker spoofs or modifies routing
information. In this way, the intruder can intentionally create
routing loops, attract or reject network traffic, change existing
routes, increase latency, and generate false error messages
[24]. Some of these problems can be reduced or avoided by
using message authentication codes and timestamps. Most
WSNs use the multihop communication principle, assuming
that every sensor nodewill act as a router and forward packets
toward their destination. The malicious node can intention-
ally drop some packets and disable their further propagation.
The easiest case to detect is when the intruder drops all
incoming packets and refuses to forward them to their neigh-
bours (a “black hole” attack). It is more difficult to detect the
case when the attacker forwards packets selectively (a selec-
tive forwarding attack). A possible countermeasure is the use
of multiple routes. The attacker can also falsify routing data
(e.g., advertising quality route to the base station) in order
to attract all traffic from a certain network part (a sinkhole
attack). A sinkhole attack can be prevented by using exact
geographic location data in the routing procedure [25, 26].
The attacker frequently uses hardware that is much more
powerful than the average sensor node (e.g., a notebook
computer). In that case, the attacker can use several false
identities at the same time, when they introduce themselves
as several legitimate nodes (a Sybil attack). A Sybil attackmay
have a significant impact on the data aggregation process and
other distributed networking mechanisms (e.g., distributed
data storage or an intrusion detection system). Possible
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measures to prevent Sybil attacksmust include a node identity
validation mechanism [27]. If the attacker has two notebook
computers, they can create a low-latency fast link between
two distant network parts that is invisible for legitimate
nodes (awormhole attack). Possible countermeasures include
precise temporal or geographical marking of every packet
(which assumes precise network time synchronisation and
exact location data) [28].
Attacks targeted at transport layer protocols usually mis-
use the connection establishment mechanism. The attacker
repeatedly sends requests to connect in order to exhaust
resources required for connection establishment. In that case,
legitimate connection requests will be ignored due to lack
of required resources. Also, some security threats in WSNs
target directly the application layer, when the attacker tries
to excessively stimulate sensors causing intensive data trans-
fer that exhaust network resources (an overwhelm attack).
Negative impacts of such attacks can be reduced by limiting
the frequency of sensor readings and by implementing of an
effective data aggregation mechanism.
4. Intrusion Detection in Wireless
Sensor Networks
Damage caused by unauthorized intrusions into computer
systems and networks can be enormous with immense con-
sequences. Consequently, intrusion detection and prevention
systems are currently a very important security mechanism
used in modern networks [29–31]. The spread of wireless
networks has posed some new challenges and demands
for IDS (intrusion detection system) development [32, 33].
Appearance and spread of WSNs requested development
of IDS adjusted especially for the WSN. Development and
implementation of intrusion detection systems designed for
WSNs are still an intensive research area [34–38]. Due to
constrained resources and other influencing factors, the
implementation of IDS into a WSN represents a great chal-
lenge. Some of the important factors that affect the intrusion
detection problem in WSNs are network topology, node
mobility (mobile or stationary nodes), openness (allowed
access for new nodes), current application, environment,
routing algorithm, use of encryption, and interconnection
with other networks.
Although there are some recent proposals of the intrusion
detection systems for WSNs, generally they are intended
for the conventional WSNs [39, 40]. There are also some
attempts to improve routing mechanism in order to mitigate
some types of attacks [41]. Therefore, there is still a lack of
adequate IDS especially adapted for IPv6-based WSN with
full IPv6 support implemented. The proposed IDS aspires to
contribute to solution for this problem. In respect of detection
methods and algorithms, the proposed system has certain
similarities with some other intrusion detection systems
proposed for conventional WSNs. It can be classified as a
fully distributed and cooperative system that does not rely
on any centralized network infrastructure. Consequently, it
is most suitable for flat network infrastructures where each
node cooperatively participates in all decisions and actions.
There are some examples of the recently proposed distributed
systems for conventional WSNs [42, 43]. On the other hand,
some recent proposals of the intrusion detection systems
for conventional WSNs rely on a hierarchical (multilayer) or
clusterednetwork structure [44].Theproposed system imple-
ments specification based intrusion detection technique, as
probably the best compromise with low false alarm rate and
low energy and resource demands. There are some recently
proposed IDS for conventional WSNs that also implement
specification based detection [45], while some examples rely
on the misuse based or anomaly based detection [46]. Some
proposed solutions deal with mobility of network nodes
[47]. Some authors introduce different possible detection
methods (based on data mining, machine learning, game
theory, or genetic algorithms) which require adaptation for
implementation into the IPv6-based WSN [48, 49]. Most of
the proposed solutions still focus on certain attack type and
reside at particular network layer (usually the application
layer) [50–52]. Certainly, in the future the research focus
should be on cross-layer solutions integrated into the unique
security framework with other security mechanisms.
An intrusion detection system developed for a wireless
sensor network should satisfy the following requirements and
characteristics: distributed architecture (both for data collec-
tion and for decision-making), minimal resource consump-
tion (reducing communication as much as possible), finding
a compromise between IDS effectiveness andmonitoring area
size, local data collection and analysis (without relying on
central infrastructure), the fact that node compromise must
not disrupt proper network function, the fact that neither
node may be considered as absolutely secure and reliable,
and the fact that the system should operate in real-time. The
proposed distributed system for malicious node detection in
the IPv6-based WSN tends to satisfy these requirements as
much as possible.
Generally, there are two dominant types of WSN archi-
tecture: flat architecture (all sensor nodes are similar and use
hop-by-hop communication) and hierarchical architecture
(nodes are grouped into clusters, where a cluster head is
responsible for routing operations). Network architecture
has direct influence on positioning of IDS modules. There
are a few typical positioning strategies of IDS modules:
promiscuous monitoring (IDS module on every sensor node
listening to all traffic inside the range of its receiver), IDS
module on every node analysing only packets that it forwards,
IDS module on the base station (full centralization), IDS
modules on base station’s neighbours, and IDS modules
on cluster heads. There are some proposed solutions for
intrusion detection in conventional WSNs, but most of them
are focused on a single specific attack type and do not provide
integral network security. Also, they mostly do not support
the IPv6, so their implementation into the IPv6-based WSN
would require proper adaptations andmodifications.There is
still a problem remaining and it refers to a lack of a quality and
efficient intrusion detection system intended for IPv6-based
wireless sensor networks and adapted for all specificities of
such environment.
The implementation of several different independent
security mechanisms into WSNs makes their maintenance
more difficult. Therefore, they have to be integrated through
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the unique cross-layer security framework [53]. The unique
security framework should integrate different security mech-
anisms to provide basic security premises, that is, confiden-
tiality, authentication, integrity, and availability. It should
provide the possibility of data encryption (implying also
the implementation of a secure key management mech-
anism), ensure secure data routing (supporting multiple
and alternative routes), and include techniques for secure
node localization and secure data aggregation [54–56]. One
of the most important components of the quality security
framework should be a system for detection of intrusions and
malicious node behaviour.
The proposed distributed adaptive system for detection of
intrusions and malicious node behaviour was implemented
into the unique security framework for the IPv6-based WSN
as its intrusion detectionmodule (along with a cryptographic
module, a secure routing module, and a secure data aggrega-
tion module).
5. Distributed Adaptive IDS for
IPv6-Based WSN
Numerous security issues present in wireless sensor networks
directly affect the design of security mechanisms, including
the intrusion detection system. Some typical problems are
as follows: resource limitation (which causes the need for
reduced communication and disables the possibility of using
the IPsec and public key cryptography), various possible
security threats and attack types (denial-of-service, routing
attacks, sinkhole, Sybil, wormhole, etc.), and key manage-
ment problems.
The intrusion detection system for the IPv6-based WSN
has to fulfil some general demands just like in the con-
ventional WSN. It should provide an automated mecha-
nism for attack source identification (a malicious network
node), generate proper alert for the rest of the network,
and take proper preventive measures. Every action targeted
against data, communication, or computing resources can
be considered as an attack. In order to properly detect an
attack, IDS must be able to distinguish legitimate network
activities from abnormal (malicious) ones. It could be a
serious problem, since in larger networks possible legitimate
activities can be vague and unpredictable. For distinguishing
and classification of these activities we usually use one of
the three following approaches: misuse detection, anomaly
detection, and specification based detection.
The misuse detection technique compares current net-
work activities with known attack signatures (behaviour
patterns of known malicious activities). Therefore, it is often
called signature-based detection. Its main disadvantage is
possible detection of only previously known malicious activ-
ities for which the sensor node has a stored signature. The
anomaly detection approach includes a learning phase, when
the IDS learns the pattern of normal network behaviour.
All statistical deviations from normal behaviour may in that
case be categorized as malicious behaviour. The main disad-
vantage of this method is a relatively large number of false
alarms. Specification based detection combines properties of






Figure 1: Watchdog technique: a possible error example.
method for the proposed IDS for the IPv6-based WSN. Like
the anomaly detection technique, it also detects deviations
from normal behaviour, but it has manually predefined
specifications that describe normal network behaviour. Such
approach is less resource demanding, and at the same time it
also enables detection of novel attack types.
The proposed IDS is fully distributed and it relies on
the cooperative decision-making procedure. Identical IDS
modules are implemented on every wireless sensor node,
executing cooperative algorithms and communicating with
other modules. Since the system is fully distributed, every
network node monitors network traffic. The watchdog tech-
nique is used for traffic monitoring purposes. It is assumed
that every network node has several neighbouring nodes
inside the range of its transceiver. Accordingly, all IDS
modules listen to their neighbour’s traffic and collect data that
represent input parameters into collective decision-making
process.
Figure 1 illustrates the situation when node A sends a
packet to node D (route A-B-C-D). Node C is malicious,
and it selectively drops packets addressed to node D. After
sending the packet to node C, node B listens to whether node
C forwards packet to node D (node B acts as a watchdog).
If at the same time node A transmits to node B, due to
collision, node B will not be able to determine if node C
forwards packets or not. Also, it is possible that node B
wrongly concludes that node C successfully forwarded the
packet to node D. It will happen if node D or node E starts
transmission at the same time. Therefore, it is clear that only
one watchdog node is insufficient for successful detection
of malicious behaviour. That is why IDS modules collect
data from more surrounding watchdog nodes, where nodes
cooperatively make final decisions.
At first sight, it seems that trafficmonitoring by watchdog
nodes will significantly increase power consumption. For-
tunately, it is not true, since in most radio communication
systems implemented in WSNs sensor nodes already receive
packets broadcasted from their neighbours. Therefore, addi-
tional power is used only for additional data processing and
for communication between IDS modules.
The intrusion detection problem (IDP) includes detection
that a certain network node is attacked (compromised) aswell
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as identification of the attack source. Therefore, a solution
(algorithm) to the IDP must satisfy the following properties:
(i) If a legitimate node indicates possible malicious
behaviour of another node, it will join the group of
alerted nodes, and a potentially malicious node will
be characterized as the attack source.
(ii) If a malicious activity occurs, after a finite time
interval all legitimate nodes from the group of alerted
nodes will indicate possible malicious behaviour of
the observed node.
The basic idea of cooperative intrusion detection is a mutual
exchange of IDS agents (modules) output data. Modules
exchange data about suspicious nodes, narrowing the group
of possiblemalicious nodes. It is also possible that amalicious
node falsely accuses its neighbours of malicious activities.
There are two main conditions for solving the intrusion
detection problem: intrusion detection condition (IDC) and
neighbourhood conditions (NC). Intrusion detection con-
dition is satisfied if neither network node has an identical
alerted set as the malicious node. There are two neigh-
bourhood conditions: all neighbours of the malicious node
are alerted (first condition) and if two or more nodes are
suspected by amajority of nodes, then all legitimate suspected
nodes must have nonalerted neighbours (second condition).
The intrusion detection problem (IDP) can be solved by a
deterministic algorithm if (and only if) intrusion detection
condition (IDC) or neighbourhood conditions (NC) are
satisfied.
The Contiki operating system was used as a software
platform for the implementation of a distributed adaptive
intrusion detection system [57]. Contiki was one of the first
operating systems for sensor networks that supports the IP.
First, it was IPv4 support, and then after 6LoWPAN speci-
fication the IPv6 support was added. The implementation of
IPv6 support was followed by support for the RPL. Support
for IPv6 and RPL were the reasons for using the Contiki
operating system. For testing and simulation purposes, we
used the COOJA simulator, since it fully supports the Contiki
OS at multiple levels, from machine code level to operating
system level [58].
The system for malicious node detection in the IPv6-
based WSN is a fully distributed system, based on collabo-
rative algorithms without relying on central infrastructure.
IDS modules (agents) are implemented on every node in
the WSN. The main task of the IDS agent is to monitor
neighbouring nodes (within transceiver range) and to par-
ticipate in the collective decision process. The implemented
algorithm operates independently of the primary sensor
network application. The system is fully adapted for the
protocol stack in the IPv6-based WSN (Figure 2).
The IDS agent core operates on the application layer. The
UDP is used as the transport layer protocol, while the RPL
is implemented as a routing protocol [59]. The 6LoWPAN
adaptation layer is implemented for IPv6 header compression
purposes, enabling the efficient transfer of IPv6 packets
over the IEEE 802.15.4 physical layer [60]. Functionality








Figure 2: IPv6-based WSN protocol stack.
basic components: network monitoring (data gathering by
monitoring neighbours’ network traffic), decision-making (a
collective process based on exchanged data through mutual
communication and collaboration between IDS agents), and
reaction (action in casemalicious behaviour of a certain node
has been detected). After sending the packet, every node
monitors its neighbours in order to determine whether they
forward packets further toward their final destination or not
(a watchdog approach). Nonforwarded packets may indicate
malicious behaviour, since in the WSN surroundings many
other factors may also influence packet delivery success (e.g.,
collisions or node failures).
Therefore, the intrusion detection system defines a finite
time interval in which the IDS module counts dropped
packets on neighbouring nodes. The duration of this interval
is a variable and adjustable parameter. Also, the threshold
is defined that represents the maximal number of allowed
packet drops. If dropped packets outnumber the threshold,
the observed node is considered suspicious. This threshold is
also a variable and configurable parameter that can be defined
according to current application and network conditions.
Due to a large variety of WSNs (regarding number and
density of nodes, link capacity, and data amount) and their
possible applications, it is impossible to set universal values
of these parameters (monitoring interval and threshold) for
all situations. Parameter values should be adjusted for every
particular application. The proposed IDS uses a specification
based detection approach, since other approaches (misuse
detection or anomaly detection) would be more resource
demanding.The structure of the IDS for the IPv6-basedWSN
is presented in Figure 3.
An intrusion detection agent consists of two main mod-
ules: a local detection module and a cooperative detection
module.Thesemodules are interconnected and together they
participate in the process of detectingmalicious sensor nodes.
These two modules are also connected with a module for
local traffic monitoring and with communication modules
(for communication with other IDS agents and with the
















Figure 3: Intrusion detection system structure.
base station). Communication modules are indispensable
for construction of the distributed system, since its proper
functioning is based on cooperation of many IDS agents.
5.1. Local Detection Module. A local detection module is
connected to a local traffic monitoring module that gathers
data required for local decisions. This module analyses
gathered data and creates a list of suspected neighbouring
nodes (according to previously defined specifications). The
local detection module alerts other neighbouring nodes
about its suspect list. Every node creates a list of its sus-
pected neighbours (neighbours whose behaviour can be
characterized as possibly malicious). Also, the local detection
module estimates the probability of malicious behaviour
of its neighbours. This probability estimation is based on
the number of forwarded and dropped packets during the
observed time interval. Every node 𝑠 estimates the probability
of malicious behaviour of its neighbour 𝑖 according to
𝑝
𝑚







, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 (𝑠) . (1)
𝑝
𝑚
(𝑖) is the estimated probability that neighbouring node
𝑖 behaves maliciously, 𝑛
𝑟
(𝑖) is the number of packets that
node 𝑖 receives, 𝑛
𝑓
(𝑖) is the number of packets that node 𝑖
forwards, and𝑁(𝑠) is a set of neighbouring nodes of node 𝑠. If
estimated probability 𝑝
𝑚
(𝑖) exceeds the predefined threshold
value, node 𝑖 will be added to the suspect set 𝐷(𝑠) of node
𝑠. Node 𝑠 exchanges its list of suspected nodes (together
with estimated probabilities) with other network nodes. After
alert messages (which contain lists of suspected nodes and
estimatedmalevolence probabilities) are exchanged, when all
nodes gather messages from other nodes, the cooperative
detection module is being activated. The cooperative detec-
tion module will make the final decision about suspected
nodes. A trivial case is the situation when a certain sensor
node has only one neighbouring node on its suspect list
with the estimated malevolence probability equal to 1. In that
case, the local detection module can directly activate local
reaction and communication modules, without any need for
the cooperative decision procedure. Figure 4 represents the
operating algorithm of the local detection module.
5.2. Cooperative Detection Module. The main task of the
cooperative detection module is to make the final decision
about behaviour character of suspected sensor nodes. The
module makes this decision cooperatively with other nodes.
The decision is made after executing the cooperative algo-
rithm that implements a majority voting mechanism about
node malevolence. Input data for the cooperative decision-
making process are suspect node lists together with estimated
malevolence probabilities. The final malevolence probability
for every network node is calculated after execution of coop-
erative algorithms. If this value outnumbers the predefined
threshold, the corresponding node will be finally declared as
malicious. The final probability for every node is calculated
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This probability is calculated as the average of all estimated
probabilities 𝑝
𝑚
(𝑖) by all nodes that put node 𝑠
𝑖
into the




) is above the predefined
threshold value, the corresponding node will be considered
malicious. In case more probabilities are above the threshold,
the node with most votes will be classified as malicious.





) will be declared malicious if some nodes have an
equal number of votes. In case behaviour of certain nodes
is marked as malicious, the cooperative detection module
activates communication modules in order to inform the
base station and other network nodes. Malicious nodes will
be excluded from the network by local reaction modules.
Figure 5 presents the algorithm for the cooperative detection
module.
5.3. Testing Scenarios. Behaviour of the proposed system for
malicious node detection in the IPv6-based WSN was anal-
ysed and tested through different scenarios typical of sensor
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Monitor behaviour of neighbours
(count forwarded/rejected packets)




Create list of suspected nodes
(with belonging probabilities)
Are there any malicious neighbours?
Yes
No
Forward list of suspected nodes
to cooperative detection module
Begin
(network initialization, route setup,
starting of IDS agents. . .)
Figure 4: Local detection module algorithm.
networks. The possibility of successful detection of nodes’
malicious behaviour and the system influence on normal
network functioning (primarily on power consumption and
bandwidth occupation) were the focus of analyses and tests.
All tests were performed in three different networks. The
first network consists of 6 nodes (5 sensor nodes and the base
station), the second network consists of 10 nodes (9 sensor
nodes and the base station), and the third network consists
of 17 nodes (16 sensor nodes and the base station). These
topologies were chosen because they reflect a large variety of
practical sensor network applications. In all testing scenarios,
the base station is located near the edge of the network area
in order to enforce multihop communication. All network
nodes have the same physical characteristics (a homogenous
network) and the implemented IPv6 stack.
Three scenarios were analysed in every network (6,
10, and 17 nodes). The difference between these scenarios
lies in the probability of successful sending and receiving
of data packets. The first scenario represents a reference
ideal case, where this probability equals 100%. However, the
Exchange lists of suspected nodes
with other IDS agents
Calculate malevolence probability
for all nodes





(alert other nodes and base station)
For every node above threshold
determine number of “votes” above it
Is there a node with
largest number of “votes”?
Declare node as malicious





(network initialization, route setup,
starting of IDS agents. . .)
Figure 5: Cooperative detection module algorithm.
packet loss in WSN is common due to interference, node
failures, or collisions and sometimes malicious activities. It
is very important to consider these situations, since packet
losses and a need for retransmission directly affect network
performance and resource consumption and also complicate
(in extreme situations even prevent) detection of malicious
activities. For that reason, beside ideal scenario two addi-
tional scenarios in all three networks are analysed. In the
second scenario, in all networks Rx/Tx success ratio was 80%,
and in the third scenario it was 60%.
Previous analysis of theWSNwithout intrusion detection
system was performed for performance testing purposes
(total of 9 scenarios, three scenarios in three different
networks), in order to analyse normal network behaviour
without any IDS influence on WSN performance. Thereby,
sensor nodes collect data from their surroundings (temper-
ature, humidity, and illumination) and send them to the base
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station periodically (every minute). In all performed tests,
the network was monitored during the one-hour interval. In
every testing scenario, after network initialization and route
establishment, the number of neighbours and the number
of hops to the base station were recorded for every node.
Since in observed scenarios all nodes were static, these values
are generally related to network topology. Therefore, for the
same network they did not significantly change depending
on the analysed scenario (minor changes may occur if
packet loss causes network reconfiguration and changes in
some parts of the routes). The following parameters were
observed and recorded for all testing scenarios: the number
of received packets (for every node), the number of lost
packets, ETX metrics (which shows the required number of
retransmissions on individual links), an average radio duty
cycle (for every network node), and power consumption
(average for every network node). Total power consumption
for every node includes the following four components:
CPU consumption, consumption in low power mode (LPM),
and radio transceiver consumption in listen and in transmit
mode. The results obtained are used for comparison with
identical scenarios, but with the proposed intrusion detection
system implemented into the network (topology and all other
parameters remained unchanged) in order to analyse the
impact of the IDS on normal network operation. The goal
was to investigate if the implemented IDS distorted network
performances and whether it causes significant power con-
sumption increment. Therefore, after IDS implementation,
the analysis was repeated through all nine characteristic
scenarios.
In addition to performance testing, the analysis of
malicious behaviour detection capabilities of the proposed
IDS was also performed. Detection capability analysis was
also accomplished through the nine mentioned scenarios
(three characteristic scenarios in three different networks),
since detection capability is directly influenced by the total
number of nodes and the number of networking nodes,
as well as the number of unintentionally dropped packets.
Every analysed scenario included one malicious node that
selectively forwards packet, where it drops 80%of the packets.
Two different situations were taken into consideration for
every analysed scenario. In the first case, a malicious node
selectively drops packets without accusing its neighbours
of malicious behaviour. In the second case, a malicious
node falsely accuses its neighbours of malicious behaviour,
trying to disrupt IDS detection capabilities. IDS detection
capabilities were analysed through all described scenarios,
where the system also estimates malevolence probabilities of
network nodes. The performed analyses resulted in certain
conclusions about the influence of the number of nodes, the
number of dropped packets, and malicious node behaviour
on detection capabilities of the proposed IDS.
6. Result Analysis
6.1. IDS Performance Analysis. Performance analysis of the
proposed IDS was performed through 9 different scenarios
in three previously described different networks (6 nodes,






Figure 6: Six-node network topology.
6 nodes (5 sensor nodes and the base station), as shown in
Figure 6.
Node 1 is the base station, while the others (2–6) are
regular sensor nodes. Raster pattern size in the figurematches
10m distance. A radio transceiver range is set to 30 meters
(circular area), while the interference area radius equals 50
meters.These values directly influence network topology and
the establishment of the routes to the base station, since the
possibility of direct communication between nodes depends
on their transceiver range. In a 6-node network, the base
station is within the range of nodes 2 and 3. Neighbouring
nodes are nodes that can directly communicate with each
other. Therefore, a neighbouring node of node 4 is node 2,
while a neighbouring node of node 6 is node 3. Neighbouring
nodes of node 5 are nodes 2 and 3. Accordingly, nodes 2 and 3
have three neighbours, and node 5 has two neighbours, while
nodes 4 and 6 have one neighbouring node. Consequently,
routes from nodes 4, 5, and 6 to the base station include 2
hops, while nodes 2 and 3 can directly communicate with the
base station.
After network initialization, every network node peri-
odically (once a minute) sends its sensor readings to the
base station (temperature, humidity, and illumination).Three
scenarios with a different Rx/Tx success ratio were analysed.
This ratio is 100%, 80%, and 60%, in the first, second, and
third scenario, respectively. All tests were performed with
and without the intrusion detection system implemented, in
order to draw a conclusion about the IDS impact on network
performance. Values of observed parameters (described in
Section 5.3) are collected for all sensor nodes, and their
summarized average values for 6-network nodes are given in
Table 1.
In the first analysed scenario (which represents an ideal
case, with no packet loss), the increased number of received
packets can be noticed after the implementation of the IDS.
It was expected since additional traffic is generated by the
IDS agents. However, it is important to notice that there
is no significant change in total energy consumption (since
energy is the most limited resource in the WSN) after the
IDS implementation. Some minimal deviations in recorded
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Table 1: Performance analysis of 6-node network.
6 nodes Received packets Lost packets Hops to BS ETX Energy consumption (mW) Duty cycle (%)
CPU LPM Listen Transmit Total Listen Transmit
Scenario 1 (Rx/Tx = 100%)
w/o IDS 59.200 0.000 1.600 1.008 0.065 0.162 0.391 0.033 0.650 0.651 0.062
w/ IDS 65.800 0.000 1.600 1.002 0.064 0.162 0.389 0.029 0.649 0.649 0.054
Scenario 2 (Rx/Tx = 80%)
w/o IDS 58.400 0.600 1.600 2.256 0.083 0.161 0.419 0.146 0.808 0.699 0.274
w/ IDS 65.800 0.600 1.600 2.057 0.083 0.161 0.423 0.138 0.806 0.706 0.260
Scenario 3 (Rx/Tx = 60%)
w/o IDS 50.600 7.000 1.629 5.991 0.135 0.159 0.514 0.484 1.292 0.857 0.912
w/ IDS 57.800 8.800 1.600 5.793 0.134 0.159 0.521 0.498 1.312 0.868 0.938
values can be explained by the application of stochastic
algorithms and inability to measure real consumption very
precisely. In the second scenario (with the Rx/Tx success
ratio of 80%), smaller packet loss can be noticed in spite of
acknowledgement and retransmission mechanisms used. An
increment of the ETX compared to the first scenario shows
that retransmission of some packets was necessary. A need
for packet retransmission leads to an increased transceiver
activity, which can be observed from their duty cycle. Since
the radio transceiver is the most energy demanding part of
the sensor node, its increased activity leads to an increase in
energy consumption compared to the first scenario. However,
the implementation of the IDS still does not bring any
significant difference in energy consumption (compared to
the same scenario without the IDS). The third scenario
additionally increases the need for packet retransmission
(the indicator is increased ETX), since the packet Rx/Tx
success ratio is reduced to 60%, resulting in increased energy
consumption. In spite of the retransmission mechanism, an
increased number of lost packets were recorded. In the third
scenario with the implemented IDS, a slight increase in
energy consumption compared to the case without the IDS
can be noticed.
The second testing network consists of 10 nodes (9 sensor
nodes and the base station). The topology of second testing
network is shown in Figure 7.
As in the first network (6 nodes), testing was performed
through three scenarios, where the Rx/Tx success ratio was
100%, 80%, and 60%, respectively. In a 10-node network,
nodes have from 2 to 5 neighbouring nodes (nodes 3, 7, and 9
have 2 neighbours; nodes 1, 6, and 8 have 3 neighbours; nodes
2 and 4 have 4 neighbours; and node 5 has 5 neighbours).
Nodes 1, 2, 4, and 5 have one hop to the base station, nodes
3, 6, 7, and 8 have two hops, and node 9 has three hops.
Average values of observed parameters in a 10-node network
are summarized in Table 2.
The first analysed scenario in a 10-node network also rep-
resents the ideal case, without lost packets and any need for
retransmission. The implementation of the IDS introduces a
small amount of additional network traffic (generated by the
IDS agents), without a significant influence on total energy
consumption. Total average energy consumption of the first













Figure 7: 10-node network topology.
scenario in a 6-node network. A decreased probability of
successful packet transmissions in the second scenario causes
packet loss and retransmissions. An increased transceiver
activity increases energy consumption, which is comparable
with consumption in an equivalent scenario in a 6-node
network. The implementation of the IDS slightly increases
energy consumption, but not to the extent of making the
IDS implementation not justified. Further decrement of the
Rx/Tx success ratio in the third scenario (to 60%) addi-
tionally increases the number of required retransmissions
(the indicator is the ETX metrics) and energy consumption.
Total consumption rises after the implementation of the IDS,
but the increment is less than 10% and does not jeopardize
validity of the IDS implementation.
Three different scenarios (with the Rx/Tx success ratio
of 100%, 80%, and 60%) were also analysed in a 17-node
network. The topology of the third testing network is shown
in Figure 8 (nodes 1–16 are regular sensor nodes, and node 17
is the base station).
In a 17-node network, sensor nodes have 2 to 5 neighbours
(nodes that are in a direct transceiver range). The minimal
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Table 2: Performance analysis of 10-node network.
10 nodes Received packets Lost packets Hops to BS ETX Energy consumption (mW) Duty cycle (%)
CPU LPM Listen Transmit Total Listen Transmit
Scenario 1 (Rx/Tx = 100%)
w/o IDS 62.222 0.000 1.667 1.000 0.064 0.162 0.392 0.029 0.647 0.654 0.055
w/ IDS 67.444 0.000 1.667 1.000 0.065 0.162 0.394 0.032 0.652 0.657 0.060
Scenario 2 (Rx/Tx = 80%)
w/o IDS 58.667 1.222 1.690 1.766 0.081 0.161 0.431 0.133 0.806 0.718 0.250
w/ IDS 65.889 0.667 2.079 1.914 0.098 0.161 0.473 0.219 0.951 0.789 0.412
Scenario 3 (Rx/Tx = 60%)
w/o IDS 51.889 7.333 1.692 5.148 0.122 0.160 0.527 0.409 1.218 0.878 0.770
w/ IDS 50.556 10.556 1.718 4.554 0.134 0.159 0.544 0.478 1.315 0.907 0.899
Table 3: Performance analysis of 17-node network.
17 nodes Received packets Lost packets Hops to BS ETX Energy consumption (mW) Duty cycle (%)
CPU LPM Listen Transmit Total Listen Transmit
Scenario 1 (Rx/Tx = 100%)
w/o IDS 59.500 0.000 2.563 1.001 0.068 0.161 0.405 0.042 0.676 0.675 0.079
w/ IDS 66.625 0.000 2.563 1.000 0.069 0.161 0.407 0.043 0.680 0.678 0.081
Scenario 2 (Rx/Tx = 80%)
w/o IDS 58.375 1.250 2.582 2.001 0.108 0.160 0.502 0.276 1.047 0.837 0.520
w/ IDS 64.563 1.750 2.648 2.029 0.110 0.508 0.847 0.289 1.068 0.847 0.545
Scenario 3 (Rx/Tx = 60%)
w/o IDS 44.267 13.867 2.366 5.574 0.160 0.159 0.644 0.605 1.568 1.073 1.140



















Figure 8: 17-node network topology.
distance from the base station is one hop (for nodes 1, 2,
5, and 6), while maximal distance is 5 hops (for node 16).
Average values of observed parameters in a 17-node network
are summarized in Table 3.
Similarly to 6-node and 10-node networks, the first
scenario in a 17-node network is the ideal case without
packet losses and retransmissions. Also, there is no significant
difference in power consumption for this scenario before and
after the IDS implementation. In the second scenario, some
packet losses appear, and packet retransmissions increase
average energy consumption. Average energy consumption
is slightly larger than in equivalent scenarios in 6-node and
10-node networks, but the implementation of the IDS in this
scenario does not increase energy consumption significantly
either. The third scenario in a 17-node network (the Rx/Tx
success ratio is 60%) records the largest number of lost
packets and retransmissions and consequently the smallest
number of received packets. Moreover, in one case, due to
excessive packet loss, the furthest node (node 16, i.e., 5 hops
far from the base station) could not communicate with the
base station. As expected, the third scenario in a 17-node
network records the highest energy consumption. However,
even in this scenario the implementation of the IDS does not
significantly increase energy consumption.
The performed analyses show that the implementation
of the proposed system for detection of malicious node
behaviour in the IPv6-based WSN does not significantly
degrade network performance. Also, it is a very important
fact that the implementation of the proposed IDS does not
lead to a significant increase in energy consumption as
the most limited resource in the WSN. Moreover, in some
analysed scenarios the difference in power consumption with
and without the IDS is almost indistinguishable (because
its magnitude is smaller than possible errors that can be
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expected in the measurement process), while in other cases
the difference does not exceed several percent.
Energy efficiency (e.g., very small additional energy
demands) represents one of the two most important pre-
conditions that the IDS must satisfy in order to consider
its practical application and implementation into the WSN.
Another important prerequisite is its capability for successful
detection of malicious network nodes. Therefore, the follow-
ing section analyses malicious node detection possibilities of
the proposed IDS.
6.2. IDS Detection Capabilities Analysis. The analysis of mali-
cious node behaviour detection capabilities for the proposed
IDS was performed (similarly to its performance analysis)
in three previously described networks with 6, 10, and 17
network nodes, respectively. In every network, detection
capability was tested in all three characteristic scenarios (as
in the case of performance testing) with the Rx/Tx success
ratio of 100%, 80%, and 60%. It is important to test the IDS
in such environment, where a malicious activity is not the
only possible cause of packet dropping, but the packets can be
lost during normal network operation (e.g., due to noise and
collisions). A noisy and lossy environment makes malicious
node detection more complicated.
In every analysed scenario, one malicious node was
intentionally installed into the WSN. The malicious node
selectively forwards packets such that it drops 80% of packets,
while it forwards 20% of packets toward their destination.
Two different cases were considered in every analysed sce-
nario. In the first case, a malicious node just selectively
forwards traffic in a described way (80% drops, 20% for-
wards). In the second case, besides selective forwarding, a
malicious node falsely accuses its neighbouring nodes of the
same malicious behaviour, and in this way it intentionally
aggravates correct detection of the IDS.
A feature of the proposed IDS is its capability to estimate
the malevolence probability besides characterization of a
sensor node as malicious or legitimate. For testing purposes,
the probability threshold is 50% (a node is considered
malicious if the malevolence probability is greater than 50%).
This threshold is adjustable and can be adapted to specific
application requirements. In given tables, every row includes
malevolence probabilities that every node estimates for its
neighbouring nodes. The last row includes calculated final
malevolence probabilities for every node. Some cells are
empty since corresponding nodes are not neighbours, and
therefore there is no estimated probability. The goal of the
analysis is to determine the influence of different factors (e.g.,
the number of nodes, lost packets, and behaviour of the
malicious node) on successful detection of a malicious node.
In a 6-node network (Figure 6), a malicious node is node
3. Table 4 contains estimated malevolence probabilities (in
percent) for the first scenario (the Rx/Tx success ratio is
100%) in a 6-node network. The first number in each cell
represents the estimated malevolence probability when a
malicious node does not try to falsely accuse its neighbours
(scenario 1a).The second number in each cell (printed in ital-
ics) represents the estimated malevolence probability when
a malicious node additionally falsely accuses its neighbours
Table 4: Detection in 6-node network, scenario 1.








(%) 0.0/0.0 80.3/80.3 0.0/0.0 0.0/80.3 0.0/80.3
Table 5: Detection in 6-node network, scenario 2.








(%) 0.0/0.0 78.5/78.5 0.0/0.0 1.5/41.8 3.0/83.3
(scenario 1b). For example, the value “0.0/80.3” in the third
row, the sixth column, means that in scenario 1a node 3
estimates themalevolence probability of 0.0% for node 6, and
in scenario 1b node 3 estimates themalevolence probability of
80.3% for node 6 (it falsely accuses its neighbour).
In scenario 1a, the IDS easily draws a correct conclusion
that node 3 is a malicious node (with estimated malevolence
probability 𝑝
𝑀
= 80.3%). In scenario 1b (where node 3 falsely
accuses its neighbours), there are three nodes (nodes 3, 5, and
6) for which estimated malevolence probability 𝑝
𝑀
exceeds
the threshold value of 50% (𝑝
𝑀
= 80.3%). Nevertheless, the
IDS still makes a correct decision and designates node 3 as
malicious since there are two estimates for node 3 that are
above the threshold (by nodes 5 and 6), while nodes 5 and
6 have only one estimation above the threshold. However, it
is obvious that false accusations (by malicious nodes) may
significantly complicate the detection procedure and even
cause incorrect conclusions.
Table 5 shows estimated malevolence probabilities for
the second scenario in a 6-node network, where the Rx/Tx
success ratio is 80%.
It is obvious that in scenario 2a detection of a malicious
node was successful (the malevolence probability for node 3
equals 78.5%). But it is also apparent that additional packet
losses present in this scenario cause the probability 𝑝
𝑀
to be
somewhat lower than in the first scenario (which represents
an ideal lossless case). For the same reason, some estimated
malevolence probabilities for other nodes also appear. In
scenario 2b (where node 3 falsely accuses its neighbours),
there are two estimations above the threshold (for node 3 and
node 6). A correct IDS decision was made since for node 3
there are two estimations above the threshold (while for node
6 there is only one).
Table 6 contains estimated malevolence probabilities for
the third scenario in a 6-node network, where the Rx/Tx
success ratio is 60%.
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Table 6: Detection in 6-node network, scenario 3.








(%) 0.0/0.0 62.9/62.9 22.4/22.4 21.5/53.3 22.4/85.1
In scenario 3a, the IDS makes a correct decision and
declares node 3 as malicious. However, it is noticeable that
increased packet loss (Rx/Tx is lowered to 60%) reduces esti-
mation quality (the malevolence probability is 62.9%), while
at the same time malevolence probabilities for legitimate
nodes increase but are still below the threshold. In scenario
3b, where a malicious node falsely accuses its neighbours,
malevolence probabilities for three nodes (nodes 3, 5, and 6)
exceed the threshold. The IDS also makes a correct decision
in this case since for node 3 (a malicious node) there are two
estimations above the threshold, while nodes 5 and 6 have one
estimation above the threshold.
In a 10-node network (Figure 7), node 8 was deliberately
made malicious for IDS detection testing purposes. Testing
was performed for all three characteristic scenarios (similarly
to a 6-node network). Table 7 represents results for the first
scenario (Rx/Tx = 100%).
In the first case (scenario 1a), the IDS correctly recognizes
node 8 as a malicious node with malevolence probability
rating of 80.1%. In scenario 1b (where node 8 falsely accuses
its neighbours), the IDS also draws a correct conclusion. It
is noticeable that in scenario 1b some estimated malevolence
probabilities emerged for other nodes (due to false accusa-
tions by node 8), but all are below the threshold value.
Table 8 presents testing results of the second scenario in
a 10-node network (Rx/Tx = 80%).
Obviously, the IDS will correctly recognize a malicious
activity of node 8, although in this scenario somemalevolence
estimations for other (legitimate) nodes occurred (due to
certain packet loss). However, these probabilities by value
are significantly below the threshold of 50%. Actually, these
probabilities are even lower than estimated probabilities in
the corresponding scenario of a 6-node network. This is
because in the network with a larger number of nodes
every node (on average) has more neighbours, making final
estimationsmore accurate.Malicious node detectionwas also
successful in scenario 2b, where a malicious node falsely
accuses its neighbours. However, it is obvious that false
accusations increase the probability of wrong malevolence
estimations for legitimate nodes (which still remain below the
threshold).
The results of the third testing scenario (Rx/Tx = 60%) in
a 10-node network are presented in Table 9.
In scenario 3a, the IDS successfully detects a malicious




bility for a malicious node is lower than in previous scenarios
but still above the threshold (𝑝
𝑀
= 60.9%). At the same time,
𝑝
𝑀
values of incorrect estimations increase, so it happened
that for node 9 the value of 𝑝
𝑀
also exceeds the threshold
(𝑝
𝑀
= 52.75%) although it is the legitimate node. Further, it is
visible that false accusation data that a malicious node puts
into the network in scenario 3b significantly complicates a
correct decision-making process. In this example, node 9 has





is actually legitimate node. Probability 𝑝
𝑀
also exceeds the
threshold for node 8 (𝑝
𝑀
= 60.9%), which is in factmalicious.
In this example, the IDS still drew a correct conclusion since
there are two estimations above the threshold for node 8
(by nodes 5 and 7) and one estimation for node 9 (by node
8). Nevertheless, it should be noticed that the estimation for
node 9 by node 6 was very close to the threshold (47.1%).
Although it was an incorrect estimation (caused by packet
losses that occurred), it could possibly happen that this
estimation exceeds the threshold. In that case, the IDS would
draw an incorrect conclusion that a malicious node is node
9. Furthermore, it is apparent that node 9 (again due to
significant packet losses) made an incorrect estimation about
node 8 (𝑝
𝑀
was only 25.8%), which also aggravates the
decision-making process.
In a 17-node network (Figure 8), for testing purposes, the
malicious node was node 10. The results of the intrusion
detection process for the first scenario (Rx/Tx = 100%) in a
17-node network are presented in Table 10.
In scenario 1a, in a 17-node network (an ideal case, with
no packet losses), the IDS easily detects malicious activities
of node 10. In scenario 1b, there are some malevolence
estimations for legitimate nodes (caused by false accusations
by node 10), but they are all below the threshold.
Table 11 shows testing results for the second scenario in a
17-node network (Rx/Tx = 80%).
In scenario 2a, in a 17-node network, malicious node
detection was successful, but some malevolence estimations
for legitimate nodes occur due to packet losses (all below the
threshold). In scenario 2b (where node 10 falsely accuses its
neighbours), detection is also successful, but the estimated
malevolence probabilities for some legitimate nodes also
increased due to false accusations by node 10 (they are still
below the threshold).
Table 12 presents results of the third testing scenario in a
17-node network (Rx/Tx = 60%).
The results show that detection was successful in scenario
3a of a 17-node network, but it is obvious that increased packet
loss causes the increment of wrong malevolence estimations
for legitimate nodes (e.g., nodes 11 and 14 give estimations of
44.0% and 54.8% for themalevolence probability ofmalicious
node 10, while at the same time for legitimate node 15 they
give estimatedmalevolence probabilities of 53.2% and 66.1%).
False accusations by node 10 (in scenario 3b) additionally
increase incorrect estimations about malevolence of legiti-
mate nodes. Fortunately, these estimations are still below the
threshold, owing to correct estimations of a larger number
of legitimate nodes that reduce a negative impact of false
accusations by a malicious node.
Tests and analyses performed through more different
characteristic scenarios showed that the system proposed for
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Table 7: Detection in 10-node network, scenario 1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0
2 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0
3 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0
4 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0
5 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0 80.1/80.1
6 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0
7 0.0/0.0 80.1/80.1




(%) 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0 0.0/20.2 0.0/0.0 0.0/40.1 80.1/80.1 0.0/40.1
Table 8: Detection in 10-node network, scenario 2.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0
2 0.0/0.0 1.5/1.5 0.0/0.0
3 1.5/1.5 1.5/1.5
4 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0
5 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0 80.6/80.6
6 1.5/1.5 0.0/0.0 4.5/4.5
7 0.0/0.0 80.6/80.6




(%) 0.0/0.0 0.5/0.5 1.5/1.5 0.0/0.0 0.0/20.9 2.0/2.0 0.0/41.8 80.3/80.3 4.5/43.0
Table 9: Detection in 10-node network, scenario 3.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 4.5/4.5 0.0/0.0
2 4.5/4.5 23.1/23.1 0.0/0.0
3 3.4/3.4 23.7/23.7
4 0.0/0.0 0.0/0.0 9.2/9.2
5 4.5/4.5 0.0/0.0 31.3/31.3 82.3/82.3
6 16.6/16.6 0.0/0.0 47.1/47.1
7 0.0/0.0 74.7/74.7




(%) 2.3/2.3 4.1/4.1 19.9/19.9 0.0/0.0 0.0/20.6 21.6/21.6 8.5/49.2 60.9/60.9 52.75/70.6
malicious node detection in the IPv6-based WSN success-
fully detects presence of a malicious network node. Thereby,
the proposed system satisfies an important prerequisite for
the implementation into the IPv6-based WSN (in addition
to necessary energy efficiency and a minimal influence
on network performance and its proper operation). Unlike
most other IDS known in conventional WSNs, the proposed
system also gives the estimation of the node malevolence
probability (while other systems usually just declare a node
as malicious or legitimate). The performed tests showed the
influence of different parameters on the decision-making
process and the quality of estimation. Packet loss present
in the network due to noise, collisions, or failures has a
negative impact on the quality of malevolence probability
estimation. It is sometimes difficult to resolve the real reason
for packet loss, that is, whether it is one of the aforementioned
reasons or a malicious activity of the node that intentionally
drops or selectively forwards packets. Furthermore, presence
of packet loss may cause legitimate nodes to be considered
maliciouswith someprobability, whichmay, in extreme cases,
exceed the threshold value (a situation where a malicious
node is not detected or a legitimate node is incorrectly
designated as malicious). A real sensor network represents
an unstable environment in terms of communications (it is
noise-sensitive and prone to failures). Therefore, the system
should be tested before every implementation in the real
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network in order to adjust the probability threshold value to
a particular application.
The number of neighbouring nodes is an important
factor that influences the malevolence probability estimation
process. Estimations of higher quality will be obtained in
networks with a larger number of nodes, where malicious
nodes have a larger number of legitimate neighbouring
nodes. The estimations by legitimate nodes will in that case
reduce a negative impact of false data inserted by a malicious
node. Successful detection of malicious behaviour in a lossy
environment (where the Rx/Tx success ratio is less than
100%) also depends on the chosen probability threshold
value. A larger threshold value in a lossy environment lowers
the detection efficacy since larger packet losses decrease
the estimated malevolence probability for a malicious node
and increase it for legitimate nodes. Also, if the threshold
is too low, it is possible that a legitimate node will be
characterized as malicious. The performed tests showed that
many parameters influence the quality of estimation, for
example, network topology (the number of nodes and their
arrangement), the number of neighbours, packet loss (which
is not caused by malicious behaviour), and a malicious node
behaviour pattern. Therefore, it is not possible to define the
universal probability threshold value that would be suitable
for all networks.
7. Conclusions
In recent years, wireless sensor networks have been devel-
oping rapidly, and their application areas are extending
continuously. Their strong resource limitations make them
very specific and different from other types of wireless
networks. Consequently, all usual networking mechanisms
(e.g., routing or securitymechanisms) required specific adap-
tations before their implementation into the WSN. Recently,
there has been a strong tendency for interconnection of
many different devices and integration of wireless sensor
networks with other network types in the context of the
Internet of Things paradigm. Protocol architecture of most
current networks is based on the IP, and the transition to the
new version of protocol (IPv6) is in progress. These parallel
processes naturally led to the implementation of IPv6 into the
WSN.
IPv6-based WSNs represent a novel trend in the area of
sensor networks, and as such they raise certain problems
and open issues that still require adequate solutions. Secu-
rity aspects of IPv6-based WSNs are very important since
good security solutions could guarantee their wider practical
application. The paper gives an overview of security aspects
of the IPv6-basedWSN, focusing on existing security threats
and different attack types. It also analyses some existing
intrusion detection schemes that could be implemented into
the IPv6-based WSN. The authors propose a solution for
the distributed adaptive intrusion detection system intended
especially for the IPv6-based WSN. Its distributed nature
enables its execution on every sensor node in the network.
Every node monitors the activity of its neighbours and
estimates their malevolence probabilities. Final estimation
of the malevolence probability for all nodes is calculated
after all IDS agents exchange their estimations. Calculation
of the malevolence probability is also an advantage of the
proposed intrusion detection system since most existing IDS
just declare a certain node as malicious or legitimate, without
estimation of the malevolence level.
The proposed system for malicious node detection fully
supports the IPv6 in wireless sensor networks. As such, it is
suitable for the IPv6-basedWSN,while other intrusion detec-
tion solutions known from the conventional WSNs would
require a proper adaptation (they cannot be directly applied
into the IPv6-based WSN). Also, its advantage (compared to
simple single-layer solutions) is possibility of integration into
the unique cross-layer security framework along the other
security mechanisms. Due to its distributed nature (where
all network nodes contribute to decision-making process),
the proposed system is tolerant on some node failures. The
proposed system also estimates the malevolence probabilities
for suspicious nodes, wheremost existing IDS donot estimate
the malevolence level (they just declare node as a malicious
or a legitimate one). Another advantage of the proposed
system is adaptability for different application requirements
achieved by the flexible (adjustable) malevolence threshold.
At the same time, the proposed malicious node detection
method proved to be energy efficient, which is very important
in resource constrained environment of IPv6-based WSN.
Finally, the proposed system showed very good detection
capabilities despite lossy wireless environment and inten-
tional aggravation of detection process by malicious nodes.
The proposed IDS solution was implemented in three
different network topologies. In every network, detailed
tests and analyses were performed through different char-
acteristic scenarios. The goals of analysis were to examine
performance and energy efficiency of the proposed IDS
solution, its influence on normal network operation, and
its capability of successful detection of malicious nodes in
different situations. Successful detection is when the IDS
correctly indicates a malicious node and extracts it from
the set of legitimate nodes, giving thereby the malevolence
probability estimation above the predefined threshold. The
malicious node was deliberately inserted into the network
for testing purposes. Therefore, it was surely possible to
determine whether the IDS conclusion was correct or not.
The tests performed also showed that the proposed IDS
solution is energy efficient and with minor influence on
normal network operation, while at the same time it has
a very good capability of making correct decisions about
malevolence of certain network nodes. In all testing scenar-
ios, the IDS correctly indicated a malicious node, despite
its attempts to falsely accuse its neighbours and to disable
or at least aggravate the detection process. Future develop-
ment of this IDS should include support for network node
mobility that will additionally expand its possible application
range.
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